

<Articles>Metalinguistic Reason Constructions Revisited

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Metalinguistic Reason Constructions Revisited*

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1. Introduction

The conjunction *because* has a certain metalinguistic use, as in (1):

- (1) The Blackwell collection was reputed to be the most valuable private collection in the world. *Reputed*, because no one outside of invited guests was permitted to see it. (Hirose (1992:82))

In the second sentence in (1), the *because*-clause expresses the reason why the speaker used the word *reputed* in the preceding sentence. In the present article, I am concerned with this kind of metalinguistic use of *because*.¹ Little attention has been paid to this use of *because*: As far as my knowledge goes, Hirose (1992) is the only one that pays attention to such a use of *because* and gives an account of it. Following Hirose, I refer to expressions of this kind as the *expression-because* construction (or the *E-because* construction, for short).

As Hirose points out, the *E-because* construction in (1) is semantically equivalent to sentence (2):

- (2) I say “reputed,” because no one outside of invited guests was permitted to see it.

The main clause of this sentence is a finite clause, while that of (1) is only the expression used in the preceding sentence. In order to distinguish constructions like (2) from the *E-because* construction, I call them the *I say E because* construction (or

* The present article is based on chapter 6 of my dissertation submitted to the University of Tsukuba in December 2007, which was radically revised from Kanetani (2005a, 2006a). Parts of this article were presented at the First ELSJ International Spring Forum held at Tokyo University of Foreign Studies on April 27, 2008. For useful comments on earlier versions, I thank my thesis committee members and the audience at the forum. My deep gratitude goes to Patrick Farrell, who acted as an informant. I also appreciate anonymous *TES* reviewers for suggesting stylistic improvements. Naturally, any remaining errors and shortcomings are mine alone.

¹ Leech (1974) argues that *since*, but not *because*, can introduce a metalinguistic reason, pointing out that sentence (ib) is “abnormal” while sentence (ia) is “normal”:

- (i) a. What’s the answer to this problem – since you’re so clever. (Leech (1974:359))
 b. What’s the answer to this problem – because you’re so clever. (Leech (1974:359))

However, these sentences are what we call reasoning constructions, or involve conjunctions used in the speech-act domain in Sweetser’s (1990) terms. In addition, in contrast to Leech’s observation, Sweetser observes that there do exist sentences like (ib). At any rate, what Leech calls metalinguistic reasons is different from the metalinguistic reasons in the sense used in the present article. Leech’s metalinguistic analysis is based on a performative analysis (e.g. Ross (1970)), and “metalinguistic reasons” in Leech’s terms seem to include reasons for performing any speech act. As I have pointed out above, this definition encompasses what I call reasoning conjunctions as well (cf. Schourup and Waida (1988)), and thus is misleading. In this article, the word “metalinguistic reasons” is restricted to referring to the reasons for the use of a certain expression.

the ISE-*because* construction, for short). I also use the name “metalinguistic reason construction(s)” as a cover term for the E-*because*/ISE-*because* constructions unless otherwise noted.

In the present article, I discuss how the properties of these metalinguistic reason constructions can be accounted for in the construction grammar framework. I have elsewhere proposed a construction grammar approach to the conjunction *because* (e.g. Kanetani (2005b, 2006b)), and postulated the causal *because* construction and the reasoning *because* construction, as exemplified in (3a, b), respectively:

- (3) a. Sam is not coming to class because he's sick.
b. Sam is not coming to class, because he just called from San Diego.

(adapted from Rutherford (1970:95))

This article is organized as follows. Section 2 observes general properties of the metalinguistic reason constructions. Section 3 compares them with the causal *because* construction and the reasoning construction, and points out three questions that emerge in the course of the comparison. Sections 4 through 6 answer these questions. Section 7 observes another type of metalinguistic reason construction. Section 8 describes in terms of inheritance links how the constructions at issue are related to each other. Section 9 makes brief concluding remarks.

2. Facts on the Metalinguistic Reason Constructions

In this section, I observe properties of the metalinguistic reason constructions.² First, their *because*-clauses do not appear in sentence-initial position. Consider the following example (cf. (1)-(2)):

- (4) * Blackwell collection was reputed to be the most valuable private collection in the world. Because no one outside of the invited guests was permitted to see it, (I say) *Reputed*.

In the metalinguistic reason construction, the reason cannot be presupposed. More accurately, the reason has to be asserted, because these constructions express the reason why the speaker used a certain expression in the preceding context. As Hirose (1991) observes, sentence-initial *because*-clauses generally express the reason that is presupposed. Therefore, it is natural that sentence-initial *because*-clauses are not used in these constructions.

Second, as Hirose (1992) observes, the *because*-clause in the E-*because* construction can be nominalized into *because of*NP, as exemplified in (5):

² As a working hypothesis, I take these constructions as semantic equivalents, i.e. (semantically) synonymous constructions.

- (5) Talking about verbal defensiveness has proven to be a particularly effective way of making *linguists* defensive: “defensive” because of wide-scale disagreement concerning the validity of speech act interpretations which must necessarily be highly context dependent, intuitive, and, in addition, must confront the controversial problem of discerning a speaker’s intention. (Hirose (1992:85))

In this example, the reason why the speaker used the word *defensive* is expressed by the nominalized *because*-clause, i.e. *because of wide-scale disagreement*. Likewise, the *because*-clause of the ISE-*because* construction may be nominalized, as exemplified in (6):

- (6) This is an historic session for a number of reasons. This is the 26th special session in our special state’s special history.... And, finally, I say historic because of the subjects at hand.

(mt.gov/racicot/spch/SpecSess99.htm)

Third, the *because*-clause of the metalinguistic reason construction can be focalized by exclusives, as exemplified in (7):

- (7) Figure 2 shows the theoretical response of the filter. (I say) “theoretical”, simply because it is unrealistic to expect any signal to be over 200dB down from the passband level.

(sound.westhost.com/project99.htm)

In (7), the *because*-clause is focalized by *simply*, which belongs to exclusives. Exclusives other than *simply* involve *just*, *only*, *precisely*, and the like (Quirk et al. (1985:604); for details, see Kanetani (2007)).

Fourth, speech act constructions that convey statements (cf. Lakoff (1987)) can occur in the *because*-clause of the metalinguistic reason construction, as shown in (8):

- (8) ...they serve for lunch the surprisingly delicious cucumber salad. (I say) surprisingly, because who would think one could turn the big, fat American (instead of the slim, English variety) into anything one would want a lot more of.

(www.sfexaminer.com/templates/print.cfm?storyname=010704e_tower)

In (8), the rhetorical question, a kind of speech act construction, appears in the *because*-clause and the sentence is acceptable.

The observations so far suggest that the E-*because* construction and the ISE-*because* construction behave alike. However, there is a difference between them, as well. The *because*-clause of the ISE-*because* construction can be clefted, whereas that of the E-*because* construction cannot, as exemplified below:

- (9) I currently live in Hanover Pennsylvania and why *(I say) currently is

because I have lived in 5 different places around the US mostly on the east coast though. (students.juniata.edu/mclelnm2/)

Thus, the properties of the E-*because* construction and the ISE-*because* construction may be summarized as follows:

- (10) a. Sentence-initial *because*-clauses are not allowed.
- b. The *because*-clause is nominalized into *because of* NP.
- c. The *because*-clause can be focalized by exclusives.
- d. Speech act constructions can occur in the *because*-clause.
- e. The *because*-clause of the ISE-*because* construction can be clefted, while that of the E-*because* construction cannot.

In the following section, I will review properties of the causal and reasoning constructions that I discussed in Kanetani (2005b, 2006b) and compare them with those of the metalinguistic reason construction.


3. Comparison with the Causal and Reasoning Constructions

3.1. The Causal and Reasoning Because Constructions

The causal *because* construction and the reasoning *because* construction are exemplified by sentences (3a, b), respectively, repeated here as (11a, b):

- (11) a. Sam is not coming to class because he's sick. (= (3a))
- b. Sam is not coming to class, because he just called from San Diego. (= (3b))

Sentence (11a) describes the causal relation between Sam's being sick and his not coming to class. Sentence (11b) describes the speaker's reasoning process in which he draws the conclusion that Sam is not coming to class from the premise that he just called from San Diego. In the causal *because* construction, the main clause and the *because*-clause are understood as forming one information unit as a whole, while in the reasoning construction, they are understood as forming separate information units (Kanetani (2005b, 2006b)). To see this, consider the following interrogative sentences:

- (12) a. Is the ground wet because it has rained?
 - b. Has it rained, because the ground is wet.
- 

Sentence (12a) is an instance of the causal *because* construction, in which a rising intonation is used at the end of the sentence. Sentence (12b) is an instance of the reasoning construction, where a rising intonation is used at the end of its main clause; its *because*-clause is read in a falling intonation. This different intonation pattern suggests that sentence (12a) performs one speech act of question as a whole, while sentence (12b) performs two speech acts, i.e. the speech act of question in the main

clause and the speech act of statement in the *because*-clause. The different constructional properties may account for a lot of phenomena.

First, causal *because*-clauses may be nominalized into *because of* {NP/Gerund}, while reasoning *because*-clauses may not (cf. Rutherford (1970)). Observe the following sentences:

- (13) a. He's not coming to class because of (his) sickness.
 b. * He's not coming to class, because of his having just called from San Diego. (Rutherford (1970:105))

If *because*-clauses are nominalized, as in (13a, b), they may no longer perform speech acts on their own. As a result, such nominalized *because*-clauses are regarded as merely a part, or a constituent, of larger speech act. Hence, the nominalization of a *because*-clause is incompatible with the reasoning *because* construction, whereas it is compatible with the causal *because* construction.

Second, causal *because*-clauses can be focalized by an exclusive, as in (14a), while reasoning *because*-clauses cannot, as in (14b):

- (14) a. He went to college simply because his parents asked him to. (Schourup and Waida (1988:95))
 b. * It has rained, just because the ground is wet.

Since it is the speaker that relates two situations expressed in the main clause and the *because*-clause in a reasoning process, even if one says, "it has rained, because the ground is wet," logically, the cause of the wet ground does not have to be the rain. In other words, it may not have rained, and even if it has, there need not be a necessary causal relation between the rain and the wet ground. Besides, there may be other possible reasons for the speaker to conclude that it has rained, say, to see a rainbow in the sky, to see someone get home wet, to hear the news about the rain, etc. Therefore, reasoning *because*-clauses may not be focalized by an exclusive that excludes other possible reasons (for details, see Kanetani (2007)).

Third, speech act constructions that convey statements may not appear in causal *because*-clauses, but may appear in reasoning *because*-clauses (cf. Hooper and Thompson (1973), Lakoff (1987)). Consider the following sentences:

- (15) a. * He's not going out for dinner because Japanese food, his wife is cooking. (cf. He's not going out for dinner because his wife is cooking Japanese food. (Hooper and Thompson (1973:494)))
 b. I think we have more or less solved the problem for donkeys here, because those we haven't got, we know about. (*Guardian* [online])

In (15a), the topicalization in the *because*-clause is not allowed. As the parenthesized original sentence shows, the *because*-clause is inside the scope of the matrix negation.

This means that sentence (15a) is an instance of the causal *because* construction (cf. Rutherford (1970)). As in (15b), topicalization may occur in reasoning *because*-clauses. In the causal *because* construction, the *because*-clause and its main clause need to be understood as a single process, and therefore perform one speech act as a whole. In the reasoning *because* construction, the *because*-clause and its main clause perform two speech acts independent of each other. As the very name suggests, “speech act” constructions perform speech acts on their own. Thus, *because*-clauses in which a speech act construction appears perform speech acts independent of the main clauses. Hence, speech act constructions are compatible with reasoning *because*-clauses, whereas they cannot occur in causal *because*-clauses.

Lastly, causal *because*-clauses can be clefted, whereas reasoning ones cannot (cf. Nakau (1994)). Compare the following examples:

- (16) a. It's because he's sick that he's not coming to class.
 b. * It's because his wife told me that he's not coming to class.

(Nakau (1994:162))

In (16a), the causal *because*-clause is clefted. In contrast, clefting a reasoning *because*-clause yields an unacceptable sentence, as in (16b). In the reasoning *because* construction, the main clause and subordinate clause form separate information units, and each should be asserted independently. However, clefting reasoning *because*-clauses results in the backgrounded main clause, because the element in the *that*-clause of cleft constructions is understood as being backgrounded. Thus, reasoning *because*-clauses may not be clefted. A causal *because*-clause, on the other hand, may be clefted, as in (16a), because it is merely a part of a larger information unit.

3.2. Comparison

From the observations so far, we may say that the metalinguistic reason construction is similar to the causal *because* construction in terms of the nominalization of the *because*-clause and its focalization by exclusives (cf. (10b, c)). Indeed, the metalinguistic reason constructions convey a causal meaning, rather than a reasoning one, i.e., they express the reason why the speaker used a certain expression in the preceding context. Then, the main clause and the subordinate clause of these constructions should be understood as forming one information unit as a whole. In this connection, Hirose (1992) argues that the main clause of the E-*because* construction, as a word or phrase that is contextually presupposed, cannot perform a speech act on its own: The construction performs one speech act as a whole. I assume that the ISE-*because* construction, as being semantically synonymous with the

E-*because* construction (see fn.2), forms its information unit in the same way. Then, their similarities to the causal *because* construction may straightforwardly be accounted for.

If, as argued above, the metalinguistic reason constructions are similar to the causal *because* construction, the following two questions arise: (i) Why can the *because*-clause of the E-*because* construction not be clefted (cf. (10e))? (ii) Why can speech act constructions occur in the *because*-clause of the metalinguistic reason constructions (cf. (10d))? In addition, we need to consider whether there are any functional differences between the E-*because* construction and the ISE-*because* construction. In sections 4 through 6, I will give answers to these questions.

4. Why Is the *Because*-Clause of the E-*Because* Construction Not Being Clefted?

Let us first consider why the *because*-clause of the E-*because* construction cannot be clefted. The relevant example is repeated below:

- (17) * I currently live in Hanover Pennsylvania and why *currently* is because I have lived in 5 different places around the US mostly on the east coast though. (cf. (9))

Since this is an opposite behavior to the causal *because* construction, one may be skeptical of viewing the E-*because* construction as being similar to the causal *because* construction. However, just because these cleft constructions are not acceptable does not necessarily mean that the E-*because* construction is not similar to the causal *because* construction. The unacceptability of sentence (17) is simply due to the unusual syntactic form of the E-*because* construction, not due to its semantic/pragmatic factors. That is, the complementizer *why* used in the above example must be followed by a finite clause, not a word or phrase.³ Nevertheless, in (17), the simple word *currently* follows *why*. Hence, the sentence is not acceptable. As observed in section 2, the *because*-clause of the corresponding ISE-*because* construction can be clefted with no problem. This is because *why* is correctly followed by finite clauses. Thus, an unacceptable E-*because* construction with a clefted *because*-clause (e.g. (17)) is not problematic for asserting the similarity between the E-*because* construction and the causal *because* construction.

What is problematic is the second issue, i.e. why speech act constructions may occur in the *because*-clause of the metalinguistic reason construction. Before

³ In terms of generative grammar, a finite clause also counts as a phrase whose head is assumed to be the category “tense,” i.e. a tense phrase. In this article, the word “phrase” is meant to exclude tense phrases (and complementizer phrases). Tense phrases are called “clauses.”

answering this question, I will investigate in the following section what, if any, difference exists between the *E-because* construction and the *ISE-because* construction.

5. The *E-Because* Construction and the *ISE-Because* Construction

So far, I have treated the *E-because* construction and the *ISE-because* construction as semantic equivalents, and ignored differences between them even if there is any. It is generally assumed in construction grammar that if two constructions are syntactically distinct, their functions are also distinct, and each construction is considered as existing independently (cf. Bolinger (1977), Lakoff (1987), Goldberg (1995), etc.). Thus, the question is not whether a difference exists between them – for it does – but rather, what it is like.

Despite being semantically synonymous, the *E-because* construction is more restricted in its use than the corresponding *ISE-because* construction. Compare the following examples:

- (18) a. Unfortunately, a person in some cases can be HIV positive for several years without having AIDS. (I say) unfortunately only because those diseases that are readily visible get treatment quicker.
- b. Unfortunately, perhaps, a person in some cases can be HIV positive for several years without having AIDS. When they finally get AIDS they are often able to work for some time, and with treatment live a fairly normal life for several years. *(I say) unfortunately only because those diseases that are readily visible get treatment quicker.

(enzi.senate.gov/aidsaf2.htm)


In (18a), both the *E-because* construction and the *ISE-because* construction may be used; whereas in (18b), only the *ISE-because* construction can be used. Crucially, in (18a), the speaker expresses the reason why he used the word *unfortunately* right after the word is used, while in (18b), because of the intervening sentence, there is a considerable distance between the use of the word and the expression of its reason. From this, I tentatively assume that the *E-because* construction can be used right after the expression in question is used. In this connection, consider the following quote from Lambrecht (1994:93):

In order for an addressee to be able to process the presupposition evoked by an utterance it is not only necessary that she be aware of the relevant set of presupposed propositions but that she have easy access to these propositions and to the elements of which they are composed.

Along with this line, we may say that even though the expression in question is

presupposed, the speaker needs to activate it in the hearer's mind if it is assumed not to be active. It seems plausible to assume that the phrase *I say* in the *ISE-because* construction contributes to this activation, since the only formal difference between the two constructions is the presence or absence of this phrase. By saying *I say E*, the activation may occur in the following way: The speaker reasserts that he has used the expression *E* in the preceding sentence, and accordingly, it is activated in the hearer's mind. Thus, when the speaker needs to activate the expression in the hearer's mind, as in (18b), the *E-because* construction cannot be used. By contrast, when such activation is not necessary, as in (18a), either construction may be used.

In sum, although the *E-because* construction and the *ISE-because* construction convey the same meaning, the former can be used only when the expression *E* is assumed to be active in the hearer's mind. In terms of inheritance links (Goldberg (1995)), a subpart link is posited between them, as illustrated in (19) below; i.e., the *E-because* construction is a proper subpart of the *ISE-because* construction (for details, see section 8).⁴



As represented in (19), while sharing the semantic properties with the *ISE-because* construction, the *E-because* construction, having the more marked form, is more restricted in its use.⁵ That is, the syntactic and information-structural specifications

⁴ Sem., Syn., and I-S. in (19) respectively stand for semantic, syntactic, and information structural specifications. Since, as mentioned in section 3.2, these constructions express some kind of causal relation, their semantic specifications are defined as "P(roposition)₁ is a cause of my saying E." From this semantic specification, one may consider the *ISE-because* construction as an instance of the causal *because* construction, whose main clause is substituted for the specific clause "*I say E*," and hence an I-link may be posited between them. Indeed, I posited an I-link between them in my earlier works (Kanetani (2005b, 2006b)). However, as I shall argue in sections 6 through 8, the *ISE-because* construction cannot be related directly to the causal *because* construction because of the nature of metalinguistic reasons. We need to postulate an intermediate level of construction, which will be called the *XSE-because* construction (cf. Hirose (1992)). I shall closely investigate in section 8 how the constructions are related to each other.

⁵ Note in passing that this observation is compatible with a general pragmatic principle. Konno

of the *E-because* construction are subsumed under those of the *ISE-because* construction. By viewing the *E-because* construction as a proper subpart of the *ISE-because* construction, we may safely say that what holds in the latter also holds in the former (as far as information-structural and syntactic conditions are met).

6. On Speech Act Constructions in the *Because*-Clause

This section gives an answer to the last question raised in section 3.2: Why speech act constructions may occur in metalinguistic reason *because*-clauses. I have claimed in Kanetani (2005b, 2006b) that the occurrence of speech act constructions in a *because*-clause reflects the fact that the *because*-clause and its main clause form two separate information units, and hence is characteristic to the reasoning construction. By contrast, the nominalization, focalization, and clefting of a *because*-clause are all accounted for by the fact that the *because*-clause and its main clause form one information unit as a whole. Thus, the question may be rephrased as follows: Why do the *E-because* construction and the *ISE-because* construction have such bilateral, or contradictory, characteristics?

In order to answer the question, we need to revise the information structure of the metalinguistic constructions, taking into consideration the nature of metalinguistic reasons and metacognition in general (i.e. cognition about cognition). Using metalinguistic reason constructions, one connects the content being discussed with a proper linguistic form available within the context of the speech for referring to that content (cf. Dancygier and Sweetser (2000)). The mapping of the content onto the linguistic form is not an objective causal relation such as the one observed in a sentence like *the ground is wet because it has rained*, but rather a subjective process, in which the speaker chooses a particular linguistic form from a possible set of linguistic forms. This process may be illustrated as follows:

$$(20) \quad \begin{array}{ccc} \text{"content"} & & \{\text{linguistic forms} \mid F_1, F_2, F_3, \dots F_n\} \\ & \boxed{\text{mapping}} & \end{array}$$


(2005) proposes the following generalization about the correlation between formal markedness and functional specialization:

- (i) If a grammatical form is marked with reference to the grammatical convention of a given language, then the function of that form is more specialized than that of the corresponding unmarked form(s). (Konno (2005:2))

Since the conjunction *because* typically connects two clauses, we may say that the grammatical form of the *E-because* construction is marked with reference to the grammatical convention of English. As I have argued through this section, such a formally marked construction is restricted in its use than its formally unmarked counterpart, i.e. the *ISE-because* construction. Thus, the argument in this section is supported by Konno's generalization above.

In (20), the speaker connects the content being discussed with linguistic form F_1 , an element of the set defined as {linguistic forms | $F_1, F_2, F_3, \dots F_n$ }. Here, it is the speaker that relates the linguistic form with its content. Therefore, like a reasoning process, the choice of the word does not have any necessary causal relation in the real world. In such a case, the main clause and the subordinate clause are understood as forming separate information units. Then, it follows that speech act constructions may occur in metalinguistic reason *because*-clauses.

However, considering the nature of metacognition in general, we may say that expressing metalinguistic reasons is somewhat more “objective” in a sense to be discussed below. Metacognition is a second or higher level of cognitive process, i.e. a level of cognition which enables the speaker (which may be called ‘metacognitive agent’) to monitor, control, and/or regulate his cognitive processes (cf. Flavell (1971), Brown (1978)). That is, the speaker (as a metacognitive agent) sees himself mapping the content onto a certain linguistic form as if another person saw him doing it. This is illustrated in (21):



Although the mapping process, which occurs inside the speaker’s mind, is arbitrary and there is no necessary causal relation, the higher-leveled speaker objectively monitors the mapping as if he saw it happening outside of him. Thus, postulating the two levels of speakers accounts for the bilateral characteristics of the metalinguistic reason construction. That is, which characteristic the construction shows depends on which viewpoint of the two-tiered speaker is taken: The viewpoint of the speaker that subjectively connects the content and a certain linguistic form based on his knowledge; the viewpoint of the speaker that objectively monitors this mapping process.

It is worthwhile considering what part of the metalinguistic reason construction allows such two types of speakers to exist. In order to answer this question, Langacker’s (1985) argument about performative sentences is helpful (cf. Austin (1962)). Langacker claims that in performative sentences like the one exemplified in (22), both the speech event and the participants involved therein are objectified.

- (22) I say to you that this wasteful government spending must stop!
(Langacker (1985:131))

In (22), the very utterance of the sentence accomplishes the speech act of statement. Langacker thus observes that in performative sentences, the speech act itself is placed on stage as the focus of interest, and the speaker *I*, a participant of the speech event, is also an object of conceptualization. That is, the speaker is objectively seen like an actor in a play on stage, and performative clauses, e.g. *I say to you* in (22), make the speaker (normally a subjectively construed entity) go on stage, i.e. objectified.

Turning to the ISE-*because* construction, we may analogically say that the speaker objectifies his use of the word by saying *I say E*; accordingly, the speaker, as a participant of the objectified speech event, is also seen as an objective entity.⁶ As a result, the speaker can see himself as if another person saw him. Therefore, the phrase *I say* in the ISE-*because* construction does not only reassert that he has used the expression in question but also objectifies the speech act of reassertion and the speaker himself.

Lastly, in order to account for the bilateral characteristics of the E-*because* construction, recall that what holds in the ISE-*because* construction also holds in the E-*because* construction as the latter being a proper subpart of the former. Therefore, even with no trigger of the objectification such as *I say*, the E-*because* construction, like the corresponding ISE-*because* construction, has the bilateral characteristics. That is, there exist two types of speakers' viewpoints in the E-*because* construction as well.

7. Another Type of Metalinguistic Reason Construction

Hirose (1992) points out that the speaker of the E-*because* construction is not necessarily identical with the speaker of the expression in question, as exemplified in (23):

- (23) Their [Ross and Lakoff's] famous example was "Floyd broke the glass", of which they said the deep structure was "It happened that Floyd did Floyd caused that the glass became broken." "Did" because all action verbs have embedded in them the verb "do".

(Hirose (1992:83f.))


In this example, it is Ross and Lakoff that has used the word *did*, not the speaker of the sentence. Thus, the E-*because* construction in (23) corresponds to a sentence like the following:

- (24) They say "did" because all action verbs have embedded in them the

⁶ Unlike performative sentences, however, the focus of interest in the ISE-*because* construction is not the speech act itself, because the primal function of the construction is to express the reason why the speaker has used a certain expression.

verb “do”.

Sentence (24) is not an instance of the ISE-*because* construction, as the subject of the main clause is not *I*. I call a sentence like this the XSE-*because* construction, in which *X* is a variable. In the XSE-*because* construction and its E-*because* counterpart, the speaker of the sentence sees others (i.e. the speaker of the word) mapping the content onto a certain linguistic form. In accordance with the convention used in (21), this process in sentences (23) and (24), for example, may be represented as follows:



As illustrated above, the speaker of the sentence merely sees Ross and Lakoff connecting the content with the linguistic form *did*.

Recall that in the ISE-*because* construction, the higher-leveled speaker is the same person as the lower-leveled speaker (cf. (21)), which accounts for its bilateral characteristics. Thus, the speaker of the ISE-*because* construction monitors, controls, and/or regulates *his own* use of the word, whereas the speaker of the XSE-*because* construction merely observes *another person's* use of the word. This difference poses a question of whether the XSE-*because* construction and the corresponding E-*because* construction, unlike the ISE-*because* construction and its E-*because* counterpart, cannot express a subjective mapping process.

The answer, quite obviously, is that they can. Observe the following example:

- (26) They were all saying “no way”. (They said) “no way” because who in their right mind would do such a thing!⁷

In (26), the rhetorical question, a kind of speech act construction conveying a statement, appears in the *because*-clause. As noted above, this may not be predictable. However, the construction grammar analysis, in particular the notion of inheritance links, provides the solution to this problem. That is, considering the relations among constructions may account for what is not predictable from the constituents of a construction or the construction itself. In the following section, I

⁷ Strictly speaking, this example could be different from what I call the XSE-*because* construction, since the past tense verb *said* is used. What is important here is, however, that the rhetorical question appears in the *because*-clause of the corresponding E-*because* construction.

will describe how the constructions at issue are related to each other while explaining why sentence (26) is acceptable.

8. Relations among Constructions

This section formalizes the relations between the relevant constructions in terms of inheritance links proposed by Goldberg (1995). According to Goldberg, when a construction inherits its information from another construction, there are several ways to motivate the network, such as those listed below:


- (27) a. A subpart link (S-link) is posited when one construction is a proper subpart of another construction. (Goldberg (1995:78))
- b. An instance link (I-link) is posited when one construction is a special instance of another construction. (Goldberg (1995:79))

From the arguments in the preceding sections, the relations between the constructions may be described as follows. First, as argued in section 5, the *E-because* construction is a proper subpart of the *ISE-because* construction, and thus an S-link is posited between them. I have argued in section 6 that the *ISE-because* construction by nature may represent both the speaker's subjective mapping process and the objective causal relation. Such bilateral characteristics are inherited by the corresponding *E-because* construction, as being a proper subpart. Seeing the *E-because* construction as being a proper subpart of the *ISE-because* construction may not only account for their similarities but also their differences: As argued in section 5, the *E-because* construction, with the more marked grammatical form, is more restricted in its use than the corresponding *ISE-because* construction.

Second, as discussed in section 7, some *E-because* constructions (e.g. (23), (26)) are related to the *XSE-because* construction, not to the *ISE-because* construction, via an S-link. These *E-because* constructions thus have all the properties that the corresponding *XSE-because* constructions have.

Third, the *ISE-because* construction is a special instance of the *XSE-because* construction, as the former can be seen as the variable *X* in the latter being substituted for the first person singular pronoun *I*. Hence, an I-link is posited between them. The *XSE-because* construction, in turn, is an instance of the causal *because* construction, whose main clause is substituted for the specific clause "*X say E*," and thus an I-link is posited between them, as well. By positing I-links in this way, the causal sense of the *X/ISE-because* constructions may be accounted for.

Thus, all the inheritance relations may be illustrated as follows:



Seeing the inheritance relations described in (28), one may wonder how we can account for the speech act constructions occurring in the *because*-clause of the XSE-*because* construction. If it is merely an instance of the causal *because* construction, it predicts that speech act constructions may not occur in the *because*-clause. Crucially, however, positing an I-link between the XSE-*because* construction and the ISE-*because* construction entails that the former is viewed as a proper subpart of the latter. Goldberg (1995:80f.) argues that an I-link always entails an inverse S-link in the way that every construction C_1 , which is an instance of another construction C_2 and is *dominated* by C_2 via an I-link, simultaneously, *dominates* C_2 by an S-link.⁸ That is, the XSE-*because* construction and the ISE-*because* construction mutually motivate each other, and therefore the former inherits its information from the latter as well.

More specifically, the ISE-*because* construction has the following three properties, of which the XSE-*because* construction has the first two but not the last one: (i) It represents the objective causal relation (when the higher-leveled speaker's viewpoint is taken), (ii) it also expresses the subjective mapping of the content and the linguistic form (when the lower-leveled speaker's viewpoint is taken), and (iii) the lower-leveled speaker is identical with the higher-leveled speaker. In short, the XSE-*because* construction is subsumed within the ISE-*because* construction, and what holds in the ISE-*because* construction also holds in the XSE-*because* construction. Hence, the bilateral characteristics of the XSE-*because* construction.

Incidentally, it follows that the causal *because* construction is a proper subpart of the XSE-*because* construction, because the latter is an instance of the former. The causal *because* construction has only the first one of the three properties that the ISE-*because* construction has.

⁸ Goldberg (1995:234) notes, "a subpart link does not necessarily entail the existence of an instance link; there exist subpart links between certain constructions which do not involve one construction being an instance of another construction." Thus, needless to say, we do not have to see the XSE-*because* construction as an instance of the E-*because* construction.

9. Concluding Remarks

In this article, following the comparison of the metalinguistic reason constructions with the causal and reasoning constructions, I closely observed the relations between the constructions.⁹ The arguments show that considering how a construction is related with its neighbors may even explain its unpredictable behaviors, e.g. the bilateral characteristics of the E-*because* construction and the XSE-*because* construction. This suggests that constructions exist in relation with other constructions, with their information being transferred between them, rather than stand alone. I thus conclude this article by pointing out that the notion of inheritance links plays a particularly important role in understanding constructions.

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⁹ In my earlier works (Kanetani (2005a, 2006a)), I argued that the ISE-*because* construction is related to the reasoning *because* construction as well as the causal *because* construction. However, as I have discussed in this article, such an analysis does not seem plausible. For pointing out the inadequacies in my earlier analyses, I thank especially Nobuhiro Kaga.

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